Tiger Tanks: Christopher Wilbeck: Sledgehammers
Posted: Wed Jan 28, 2009 8:37 am
I have just finished this book. I am still digesting although I clearly have the urge to expel my first impressions here.
The book itself expounds upon the strengths and weaknesses of both the Tiger Tank itself and the organizational milieu it found itself in. It provides extensive discussion about how both the tactical and operational environment effected the use of the Tigers but more to the point how that was somehow ignored or mis-read by the Germans in their employment of the Tiger.
I had long known that the Tiger was a comparatively unreliable if extremely rugged beast but had never realized the extent to which that was so. Always under-strength to begin with the Tiger units found themselves with what must be considered as catastrophic levels of breakdowns before entering battle, verging on 70% in some cases. A battalion nominally at 45 tanks might head out with only 18 and arrive at the sharp end 10 or 15 kilometers away with only five or six tanks. Yet raise havoc and turn the tide anyway.
Another incredible piece of knowledge wasn't so much that the Germans never built any dedicated mine-clearing equipment (such as the mine-rollers and flail tanks of the Allies) for their panzers, they actually used the Tigers to bull their way through the minefields. Invariably the ruination of the tracks and/or road wheels would ensue and that Tiger would be hors de combat (French seems somehow appropriate). The next Tiger in line would then take up the duty. Due to the thickness of armor the crews were rarely hurt but the tank would be out of the fray.
This leads to the other failing which was the lack of a dedicated vehicle capable of towing a damaged Tiger and the lack of maintenance personnell for such a high maintenance piece of equipment. It was largely incapable of rapid movement due to the rate of breakdown, barely able, as a weapons system, to get to the battle. Once there limited in its ability to maneuver due to its weight and fuel consumption. And if and when damaged (and it was war) it was extremely difficult to recover, especially in retreat.
41% of all Tigers (I & II) lost were destroyed by their own crews, having damaged running gear, engine or transmission or simply being out of gas, so as to not be left behind for an advancing enemy. An incredible figure. Here was a weapon that did not need contact with the enemy be be undone.
The overall impact of the Tiger on the battlefield and the legend it created for itself is all the more amazing when considered against the backdrop of everything arrayed against it. Most especially its own design flaws and poor employment.
A most interesting book.
On to Otto Carius: Tigers in the Mud (who incidentally has a foreword in this book).
The book itself expounds upon the strengths and weaknesses of both the Tiger Tank itself and the organizational milieu it found itself in. It provides extensive discussion about how both the tactical and operational environment effected the use of the Tigers but more to the point how that was somehow ignored or mis-read by the Germans in their employment of the Tiger.
I had long known that the Tiger was a comparatively unreliable if extremely rugged beast but had never realized the extent to which that was so. Always under-strength to begin with the Tiger units found themselves with what must be considered as catastrophic levels of breakdowns before entering battle, verging on 70% in some cases. A battalion nominally at 45 tanks might head out with only 18 and arrive at the sharp end 10 or 15 kilometers away with only five or six tanks. Yet raise havoc and turn the tide anyway.
Another incredible piece of knowledge wasn't so much that the Germans never built any dedicated mine-clearing equipment (such as the mine-rollers and flail tanks of the Allies) for their panzers, they actually used the Tigers to bull their way through the minefields. Invariably the ruination of the tracks and/or road wheels would ensue and that Tiger would be hors de combat (French seems somehow appropriate). The next Tiger in line would then take up the duty. Due to the thickness of armor the crews were rarely hurt but the tank would be out of the fray.
This leads to the other failing which was the lack of a dedicated vehicle capable of towing a damaged Tiger and the lack of maintenance personnell for such a high maintenance piece of equipment. It was largely incapable of rapid movement due to the rate of breakdown, barely able, as a weapons system, to get to the battle. Once there limited in its ability to maneuver due to its weight and fuel consumption. And if and when damaged (and it was war) it was extremely difficult to recover, especially in retreat.
41% of all Tigers (I & II) lost were destroyed by their own crews, having damaged running gear, engine or transmission or simply being out of gas, so as to not be left behind for an advancing enemy. An incredible figure. Here was a weapon that did not need contact with the enemy be be undone.
The overall impact of the Tiger on the battlefield and the legend it created for itself is all the more amazing when considered against the backdrop of everything arrayed against it. Most especially its own design flaws and poor employment.
A most interesting book.
On to Otto Carius: Tigers in the Mud (who incidentally has a foreword in this book).
