20 years after the Kolwezi operation

[blaster_e11]

here's a quick flashback on the French airborne operation in Zaire back in 1978. You can download this bilingual report and many others here (http://www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr/p ... etex12.pdf)

LESSONS LEARNED FROM KOLWEZI - MAY 1978 by General GAUSSERES from SGDN (National Defense General Secretary)
Company commander during the airborne operation over KOLWEZI.


1. THE OPERATION OVER KOLWEZI.

• TWENTY YEARS AGO: KOLWEZI

The French intervention in the Shaba region was launched on May 18th1978 to face an emergency situation where the European population was being massacred. It had therefore a precise nature as well for its application point as for its goal: “to restore order and security in Kolwezi”.
So, the airborne operation over Kolwezi is the typical example of an overseas operation – a rapid and adapted response to a serious crisis limited in
space and time.

As a short but risky airborne operation, this intervention was a complex one. The terms of the equation were as follows:

-stake: to rescue 2 500 European hostages (2 500 Europeans included 400 French among them a technical military assistance party (1 officer, 5 NCOs) in charge of ensuring the maintenance of the AML Panhard armored cars bought by
Zaire to France) from a near certain slaughter;

-objective: Kolwezi city, widely scattered has more than 100 000 inhabitants. It spreads out on an area of around 40 square kms. It is made of
several distinctive clearly separate districts. As a mining town, it is surrounded, within a 10 to 15 km radius with satellite cities and factories (Metal-Shaba, Luilu, Kapata, Kamoto, Mutoshi, Musomoi, camp Forrest.), except to the South. The airfield is located about 6 km to the South of the town which is established along the main highways and railways linking
Lumumbashi to Dilolo, parallel to the border between Zaire and Zambia;

-logistic support: the operation was to be performed at thousands of kilometers from its departure base: It is a 8 hours flight with a four-engined
jet from Solenzara (Corsica) to Kinshasa and 1 350 km in straight line from Kinshasa to Kolwezi i.e. the distance between Paris and Warsaw;

-ennemy: from May the 13th, around 4 000 well armed “katangese” crossed the border. According to the last intelligence received, several hundreds
left Kolwezi in the morning of May the 15thwith stolen vehicles. Around 500 men were remaining, scattered in small units and supervised by Cubans.
The AML platoon of the Zairian armed forces located in Kolwezi joined the rebels.
The concept of maneuver is to successively retake the control of the residential districts in order to access to the airport after an air dropping on the former racecourse that is to say exactly at the edge of the town. So, through a vertical assault on the objective, the idea is to use surprise and to prevent
the rebels from taking reprisals against civilian populations.

The air dropping will be performed in two waves of 4 Zairian C-130 “Hercules” and 2 French C-160 “Transall”, if possible at very short intervals.

PREPARATION OF THE AIRBORNE OPERATION

Tuesday 16 May:

00h45: The battalion is placed on alert at 3 hours notice: it moves towards the Solenzara 126 Air Base on the Western coast (175 km of mountain roads).

14h30: The first companies board on four DC8 and one 707 Boeing (that is: three DC8 from UTA, one COTAM DC8 (Military Airlift Transport Operationnal Command), one Air France Boeing 707) to Africa.
The decision is made to place the weapons and ammunition as freight.
The parachutes remain in France since American parachutes from the Zairian armed forces are available in place for the jump.

Wednesday 17 May:

18h00: Arrival in Kinshasa of 3 C-160 flying in from the N'djamena and Libreville. Detachments.
Arrival at Solenzara from Orleans of the Air Force Transport Group Command, then boarding of the latter in a COTAM DC8 to Kinshasa.

23h15: Landing of the first DC8 on the civilian airport at Kinshasa.

Thursday 18 May:

00h00: Unloading of the freight and transfer to the military airport.

02h00: Technical preparation: packaging of equipment: Rigging of ammunition, radio-sets and batteries in bags for 3 combat days. There is few room
left for rations in the rucksacks.

03h00: A briefing about the operation takes place around 3 a.m. in an office of the military base on Kinshasa airport with the attendance of M Ross, the French Ambassador and Colonel Gras, the Military Attaché.
The concept of an airborne operation is set up: French-Zairian cooperation (dropping in two waves of 405 and then 250 paratroopers), selection of the dropping zone, definition of the routes and formations, preparation of the mission by the crews.

04h00: Orders are given by units. The objectives are studied on the available maps as well as the schedule of the different missions received.

06h00: It is daylight. The paratroopers finish their quick training about the American parachutes.

11h00: The first aircraft wave (the CP and three companies) takes off for Kolwezi i.e. three and a half hours flight during which the men are equipped
with their full kit (reserve parachute, main parachute, rucksack and weapon bag). The formation took off less than twelve hours after the landing of the first four-engined jet aircraft coming from France.

14h30: The pilots switch on the green light and the dropping begins at less than 250 meters high.

14h35: From far away automatic weapons fire towards the dropping zone. The paratroopers rush as fast as they can to the regrouping points at the
edge of the town.

Friday 19 May:

06h00: Dropping of the second wave flying from Kamina.

12h00: Evacuation of the first Europeans from Kolwesi airfield.

Sunday 21 and Monday 22:
Delivery of heavy logistics, medical service and vehicles through an American airlift (Galaxy and Starlifter) between Solenzara and Lubumbashi.

• BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE COURSE OF THE OPERATIONS

The dropping took place at less than 500 meters from the first objectives. Six men are wounded when landing. One legionnaire of the A Company, dropped over houses and isolated from his platoon, is found killed still harnessed with his parachute and mutilated in the street where he landed.
The first phase is a succession of engagements carried out by the Companies, violent actions of street fighting in Kolwezi are carried out to free the
European civilians taken as hostages or hidden in cellars and attics.
So 30 hostages detained in the jail of the Manika district start singing “La Marseillaise” in order to be recognized and are set free after a violent assault
during which grenade-launcher rifles and snipers bring very close support to the leading riflemen. The platoon seizes the objective and eliminates the
rebels as they are about to shoot the first hostages in their cells. The maneuver speed surprises the enemy.
The 3 Companies of the 2ndREP, dropped around 14h30, succeed in occupying the old European town before nightfall. But the rebels are settled in the Manika native town which is next to the South of the villas and buildings.
Colonel Erulin orders the Companies to speed up towards their objectives during the afternoon of May the 19th in order to control the Eastern and Western edges of the town.
A rebel motorized column counterattacking 30 minutes after the jump is stopped at the level of the railway station, the leading armored car is destroyed by a rocket-launcher direct hit doubled by an anti-tank grenade direct shot. The rest of the column breaks up and drives back.
Against a well-armed enemy willing to fight and carrying out a series of actions but without any apparent coordination, the success of our units each
time proceeds from rush actions and outflanking movements to outrun the enemy.

The African night falls very quickly. If the crossroads are held by the platoons of the 2ndREP, the rebels take advantage of the full moon to come back by infiltrating through a terrain that they perfectly know. Combats are continuing during night and are decentralized at platoon level because of the size
of the controlled areas.
Ambushes laid near the crossroads or crossing points are launched at short range by platoon leaders against armed groups moving on foot or driving towards the town center. Enemy patrols are eliminated, Kalashnikov assault rifles and sniper rifles are recovered. During all the night from 19th to 20th May, combats will go on in Kolwezi.
The jump of the second wave is postponed to the following day because of the suddenness of the nightfall and of the first wave commitment in combat
operations. Finally on May the 20 that 06h30, this second wave jumps in its turn to the East of the town, taking the enemy in the rear as it occupies the end of the new European town. This area is totally under control by the end of the morning of the 20thMay.

In the afternoon the 2nd REP seizes the Metal-Shaba mining zone held by 200 rebels. During the fights where rocket-launchers, sniper rifles and
grenades are used, one of the platoon leaders of the D Company, Sergeant Daniel is killed.

• LESSONS LEARNED AND OPERATION ASSESSMENT

• The keys to success

Intelligence. It is vital. The exchanges of intelligence between France and its allies, particularly about the local situation of the Kolwezi airfield, were
quite painful.
The concept of operation. The military Attaché in Kinshasa deserves all the credit as he understood that the operation was feasible and as he convinced
the Ambassador, the State Department and the armed forces staff.
Joint cooperation. The reciprocal knowledge between airmen and paratroopers is based on:

- the numerous repetitions of common strict training.

- the strict appliance of steadfast procedures which are the guarantee for confidence and success.
Telecommunications and computers. With the joint operations center, the Commande structure has at its disposal a very efficient tool for real-time crisis management.
Projection means. An airborne operation requires adapted means offering loading capacity, speed, range of action, tactical and parachuting abilities.
Such means provide autonomy, freedom of action and reversibility capability.

•Operation Assessment
The operation permitted to ensure the evacuation of some two thousands Europeans and to assert France’s determination to protect its nationals; The
battalion casualties amount to 5 KIAs and 20 wounded, but its results speak for themselves: 250 rebels killed, 2 armored cars destroyed, more than
1 000 weapons recovered among which 4 recoilless guns, 15 mortars, 21 rocket-launchers, 10 machine-guns and 38 sub-machine guns.

Our armed forces perfectly completed an overseas airborne operation carried out in difficult conditions. The success has been conditioned by swiftness and discretion in the execution, factors which are part of the airborne troops’ capabilities.
Operating 6 000 km away from their bases, thanks to everybody’s determination and to the excellent cooperation between the Transall crews and the 2ndREP unit leaders, combining their know-how and their experience, the French paratroopers took in less than 48 hours the control of the area saving the lives of several hundreds of families, notably French ones.
Having restored security and drove away the invaders, the French armed forces combined their military action with an unprecedented humanitarian mission. They reassured and gave back confidence to the populations (victims : 120 Europeans, 250 Katangese, 530 Zaireans) until their relief from the 6th June by an inter-African Force composed of Moroccan, Senegalese, Togolese and Gabonese forces.

2. THE 2002 NATIONAL CONCEPT FOR AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

The method chosen to draft the new concept, based on a thorough joint co-ordination and on a permanent concern for taking into account the lessons
learned from recent land and air operations, is the right one. It permits to tackle the challenges of the XXIst century and notably the European perspectives, thanks to its interoperability.



Today like yesterday, the conception of an airborne operation stems from a bold plan, inspired and approved by Commanders placed at a high joint
level and benefiting from the support of the JCS. The importance of intelligence concerning the future objectives is essential and the updating of
information is vital until the operation is launched.
Indeed during his flight down the paratrooper, under his canopy, remains an easy target with his rucksack, weapon, three days rations, three units of
fire and reserve parachute. But the staff and the battalions of the 11thAirborne brigade train to jump by day and night as low as possible in order to
come out of the reorganization phase in the shortest delays. The aeronautical standards and the technical innovations enforce an extensive training
aiming at mastering the recovering of the equipment and heavy weapons and establishing the quick connection of radio links within the taskforce and
towards the higher echelons.
The airborne raid over Kolwezi illustrates one of the types of actions retained in the new operation concept, a specific operation of limited duration and
size which in May 1978 combined raid action and evacuation of nationals. Against an unforeseen emergency situation, thanks to the strategic mobility
provided by the aircraft and to the reactivity of the committed forces, the airborne operation constitutes for military or political leaders a specific response
and a privileged tool.
Relying on permanent cooperation and mutual knowledge between the Projection Air Force Command and the 11thAirborne brigade staff as well as with the staff departments of the Land action force dealing with the third dimension, the national concept of the airborne operations mentions, among
other hypothesis, the autonomous operation.
The retained capabilities for a main echelon are organized around some 1 500 men committed with a 2 to 3 days initial autonomy.
It is thus reminded the organization of the armed forces equipped and trained for this type of action: the Airborne taskforce (GAP) relying on infantry,
and tactical transport aircraft to which are associated the vectors essential to the success of the operation (fighters, air refueling aircraft,...).
The projection support and specific forward logistic support element is one of the key points in the planning of the operation: an airborne operation base (BOAP) is deployed encompassing loading, rigging and packaging assets and specialists in the airborne techniques. In 1978, this element has been deployed on the Kinshasa military air base.